Pictured: The 1st Belorussian Front Command Staff planning the final assault on Berlin, 1945.
In the years following the Great Patriotic War, Marshal Chuikov shared his critique of the Front Commander Marshal G. K. Zhukov and his handling of the final assault on Berlin. Vasily Ivanovich stated that he inadvertently overheard a phone call between Zhukov and Stalin (which Zhukov reportedly denied the occurrence) when Stalin told Zhukov to halt the advance to Berlin in February 1945. Chuikov, who served at the front lines of battle during the offensive in Poland and Germany, held the opinion that Zhukov should have countered Stalin and demanded to push ahead with the offensive to take Berlin earlier. In the March 1964 edition of the October journal, Marshal Chuikov shared the following statement:
“The situation was favorable for us. Hitler's divisions, tied up by the offensive actions of our troops in Courland, in East Prussia, in the Budapest region, of course, could not help the Berlin garrison. The divisions transferred by Hitler from the Western Front from the Ardennes forests were not yet ready for active operations. I am sure that the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts could allocate an additional three or four armies in order to decisively move with us to the main military-political center of fascism to Berlin. And the mastery of Berlin decided the outcome of the war.”
In his review of Marshal Chuikov’s book titled The Fall of Berlin, Reuben Ainzstein shared author Erich Kuby’s support of Chuikov’s point of view. Kuby wrote that he could have captured Berlin at the beginning of February, but considers Stalin's decision to halt the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front as “one of the most fateful mistakes committed by the Soviet dictator” (93).
While reporters and researchers have discussed the rivalry and alleged ill feelings between Chuikov and Zhukov, there is a leadership lesson to be gleaned from the scenario. Vasily Ivanovich admitted his feelings of frustration and contempt toward Zhukov for not taking a stand against Stalin to end the war sooner. Despite having a fundamental disagreement with his superior, Chuikov still submitted to Zhukov’s orders during the war. The photographs preceding this blog entry show Colonel-General Chuikov seated almost front and center in the room full of army commanders who were a part of the 1st Belorussian Front meeting.
While Chuikov may not have respected Zhukov on a personal level, he more than likely respected Zhukov’s position—during the Great Patriotic War, Chuikov was his subordinate. After the war, however, Vasily Ivanovich continued his ascent in his military career to the highest rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955—an equal to Marshal Zhukov. During a public exchange at the October 1957 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Marshal Chuikov’s conversation with Nikita Khruschev about Zhukov’s deficiencies was well documented. Other remarks were also published in later articles. In 1965, Chuikov responded to criticism of his statements by his peers:
“'What is written with a pen cannot be cut down with an axe. My memoirs are subjective, but it is natural. I can’t write about other armies, I don’t know how Moskalenko fought, let him write. Perhaps I did not take into account the foreign resonance, but the editors took the manuscript from me, and there was someone to consult with." A. Epishev asked Chuikov, what was his reaction to the speeches of his comrades, did this change his former opinion? Vasily Ivanovich, with his usual frankness, replied that he was not at all inclined to ignore the considerations expressed, but he could not refuse what was written. 'Something is written correctly and maybe something is wrong.' He thanked them for the criticism and immediately added: ‘I won’t raise my hands right away, but I won’t seek press appearances.’”
In a commentary on Vasily Ivanovich's critique of Zhukov's actions and the taking of Berlin, historian Dmitri Surzhik asserted in an interview that most likely Chuikov “was driven by conceited motives rather than the desire to find historical truth.” However, given Marshal Chuikov’s character, love of his soldiers, and presence at the front during 1945, a contrasting assessment is based on the premise that Vasily Ivanovich wanted a swift end to the Great Patriotic War to save lives—the lives of Soviet soldiers, Poles, and even Germans. To draw out the war nearly 3 more months when the Red Army was so close to Germany at the beginning of February 1945 must have been highly frustrating to a number of soldiers, not just Chuikov. In my humble opinion, conceit had little to do with it…