Pictured: Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov briefing the 8th Guards Army on battle plans for an upcoming offensive, Poland, 1944.
Management By Confusion (MBC) is one way in which managers control their teams—by never giving complete clarity to the team, or by providing contradictory instructions. This type of behavior causes anxiety, uncertainty, conflict, and even inaction due to personnel paralysis. Receiving contradictory instructions affects productivity and morale, leading to a higher level of frustration and possible employee disengagement. When a leader is faced with this scenario, he must “make a way” forward often. It means taking initiative and addressing the confusion head-on, on behalf of the team.
Marshal Chuikov had to face such confusion in his experience, and he addressed it directly by conducting his own research to gain clarity. Since he was a visual learner and had the gift of making sense of situations through observation and analysis, he developed his own conclusions and approached his Front Commander, Marshal Rokossovsky, with his plans. Not one to sit back and depend upon others to take charge, Chuikov faced the confusion directly, taking personal initiative and seeking answers and information to help him develop an effective plan of attack.
The scenario highlighted in this blog post also demonstrates Vasily Ivanovich’s respect for his superiors because he presented his plan for review and approval by his superiors. And it is important to remember that confusion in an army means the difference between life and death… The following excerpt is from John Erickson’s work titled The Road to Berlin—the text describes the 8th Guards Army movements after the Battle of Stalingrad, when the soldiers were in Poland:
“Chuikov’s and Kolpakchi’s mobile columns were advancing northwest but Chuikov was baffled by the apparently contradictory orders he received—halt the advance, consolidate positions, resume the advance… The tempo of the Soviet advance as a whole was beginning to flag as the armies moved further and further from their bases, and now the confusion of instructions tended to slow the 8th Guards and 2nd Tank Army in their sweep to the Vistula [River]. […]
Chuikov’s 8th Guards still received contradictory orders: on 26 July [1944], Chuikov was ordered to reach the Vistula on the Garwolin-Deblin sector, keeping his army in compact order and in full readiness for a major engagement, with forward detachments sent ahead to a considerable distance—only to be told a few hours later that the 8th Guards Army will not become dispersed.[…]
Col.-Gen. Chuikov nevertheless realized that sooner or later his formations must force the Vistula, even though they were coasting alongside it at the moment; Chuikov himself set out to choose a particular sector, and a little to the north-west of Magnuszew, in the village of Wilga. The Army commander conducted his own reconnaissance, driving into the middle of a Polish crowd in holiday mood, taking the air on the Vistula bank and enjoying the music of accordions. From observation of the western bank, it was clear that the Germans did not expect an attack here and Chuikov planned for the Magnuszew sector to make his crossing of the Vistula.
Returning to his own HQ, Chuikov reported to Rokossovsky about his decision, which the Front Commander noted and promised to reply the next day. At noon on 30 July Rokossovsky came on the line and authorized Chuikov to prepare plans for forcing the Vistula on the Madeinwice-Stezvce sector (south of the sector Chuikov had himself chosen) giving him three days’ notice; not unnaturally, Chuikov asked for the Wilga sector, the one he had already chosen, and pointed out that he could begin operations 'early tomorrow morning, not in three days’ time, since all preparatory work has been done here.
He submitted at once plans specifying 1 August as the operational date, and this was approved. On the morning of 1 August Chuikov’s men launched their boats into the darkness; the scouts reached the western bank and had cleared the first line of German trenches before the artillery opened fire, as the rifle battalions began their crossing."
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