Pictured: Cover of The Beginning of the Path (Nachalo Puti); reviews for Marshal Chuikov’s books (in a Russian language publication from 1962, and from The New York Times on 6 April 1964); cover art for the English language translation of his memoirs.
In an article written by Harrison Salisbury for The New York Times 58 years ago, two books covering the events of Stalingrad—the English translation of Marshal Chuikov’s book titled The Battle for Stalingrad and Walter Goerlitz’s Paulus and Stalingrad—were presented as complementary works. At the time it was published, The Battle for Stalingrad was described as “the most detailed, authoritative account of that battle ever published from the Russian side, written by the general who commanded the Russian defenders of the city during the six months of the most savage fighting in World War II” (back cover). The following is Salisbury’s affirmation about the importance of Chuikov’s writing in particular:
“Until recently it has been difficult to assess the truth about Stalingrad. Almost all the documentation was German. From the Russian side had come only wartime communiques, personal battle stories, and self-serving commentaries designed to burnish Stalin’s escutcheon.
Now this situation is rapidly changing. Soviet military historians and commanders have been encouraged to write of the Stalingrad events and, in general, to present fairly scholarly studies of World War II.
Stimulated by Premier Khrushchev’s effort to demolish the Stalin myth, an increasing number of useful memoirs and military studies have appeared. These are beginning to become available in English. One of the most useful is this first volume of Marshal Chuikov’s story, whose title, literally translated from Russian is 'The Start of the Path.'
Marshal Chuikov, tough, blunt, battle-hardened—a real soldier’s soldier—commanded the famous Soviet 62nd Army, the force actually entrusted with the street-by-street, building-by-building defense of the Volga River city. Today, Chuikov is Supreme Commander of the Soviet Land Forces.
For evidence of Soviet military errors, misjudgments, and mistakes, Marshal Chuikov’s work is an excellent sourcebook. It quickly becomes apparent that if Hitler’s influence led the German generals to disaster, Stalin’s came close to the same result on the Russian side.
But any idea that the German generals were gifted with superior military wisdom, which would have triumphed had it not been for Der Fuehrer, or that the Soviet generals were just propaganda puppets of the Kremlin, quickly evaporates.
Each side had its handicaps. But in the end judgment, skill, and strength triumphed.
An accessory myth has made its appearance among some American commentators. They suggest that Stalingrad was a sham battle, a product of Communist propaganda, an event of little significance.
No one reading these complementary works (Goerlitz has had access to many Paulus materials and memoir sources not heretofore consulted) can emerge with any judgment other than that of Sir Winston Churchill that at Stalingrad […] the ‘hinge of fate’ was turned by superior Russian generalship, courage, and soldierly capability.”