In researching Nikita Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964, I discovered that Soviet researcher Joseph Torigian cited an intriguing communication from Marshal Chuikov in his article featured in the Journal of Cold War Studies. Up until October 1964, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky stood as a steadfast ally to Khrushchev within the Soviet Army. The unmistakable evidence of Malinovsky's sycophancy and Khrushchev's authoritative grasp over the military is laid bare in an exceptional letter penned by Marshal Chuikov to the Presidium, addressing "the abnormal situation" within the Ministry of Defense. According to Chuikov, this situation had notably deteriorated by the conclusion of 1962, underscoring the degree to which Malinovsky had functioned as a dedicated supporter of Khrushchev within the military apparatus until the time of the coup.
I recently gained access to the contents of Vasily Ivanovich’s letter, the text of which is presented below in its entirety. In it, he stated clearly that as a leader in the government, he bore a responsibility to speak out about his concerns. The reader can gain a sense of the intense frustration Chuikov experienced for years, culminating in a very direct but well-crafted letter establishing his case for a change in the Ministry of Defense’s leader, Marshal Malinovsky. He also points out Marshal Grechko’s role in supporting Malinovsky and asserts that both men were to blame for ineffective leadership.
____________________________________________________
Letter from V.I. Chuikov to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the abnormal situation in the USSR Ministry of Defense
21 October 1964
Sov, secret copy. No. 1
TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU:
I consider it my party duty to report to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the abnormal situation that has been created recently, especially since the end of 1962, in the Ministry of Defense, which is causing serious damage to the country’s defense capability.
As you know, the October Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957 removed the former Minister of Defense Zhukov for his disdainful attitude towards the Military Councils. In this, in particular, his Bonapartism was manifested. It would seem that the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense should draw serious conclusions from this. In words such conclusions were drawn, but in reality it turned out to be completely different. With Khrushchev's support, Malinovsky and Grechko began to treat the Main Military Council with even more disdain. And Comrade Epishev’s behavior in this matter is completely incomprehensible, or rather, conciliatory. Using the special patronage of N.S. Khrushchev, Comrades Malinovsky and Grechko, trampling on the Regulations on the Military Councils and on the Board of the Ministry of Defense, as well as the basic party principles, essentially ruled the ministry uncontrollably, and in many cases they committed arbitrariness. This is convincingly evidenced by the following facts:
1. According to the Regulations on the Main Military Council, it should meet once a quarter to discuss the most fundamental issues of the organization and construction of the Armed Forces military forces, military-political education, progress and results of operational and combat training. This provision is not systematically implemented. For the last time, the Main Military Council gathered in February 1963, i.e. more than a year and a half ago. But even at this Council, an unimportant issue was discussed, and not those issues that were especially important for the development of our Armed Forces and required collective discussion of the largest military leaders. Thus, the Council was held, as they say, for the departure of the issue.
2. An equally abnormal situation has developed in the Board of the Ministry of Defense. The Board of the Ministry of Defense only creates the appearance of a collective discussion and decision. In reality, any fair, but objectionable comments and suggestions to Malinovsky and Grechko are regarded as undermining unity of command and authority minister. This abnormal situation has led and continues to lead to the fact that decisions are essentially made not by the Main Military Council and the Board of the Ministry of Defense, but by the minister, without taking into account the opinions of the members of the Council and the Board. Those who did not agree with such decisions and persistently proved their rightness, compromised in every possible way at official meetings and reviews, where it was impossible, without undermining discipline, to object or make a remark.
Subsequently, for various reasons, such people were released from work, transferred to the reserves, or enrolled in the inspection group. Essentially, all prominent military leaders and Marshals of the Soviet Union, immediately after being included in the inspection group, were expelled from the Main Military Council and from the Board of the Ministry of Defense, removing them from active participation in military construction. The great Lenin, as is known, considered it possible and necessary to use famous advisers to such tsarist generals as Brusilov, Zayonchkovsky and others. And Malinovsky strives as quickly as possible to get rid of the advice of outstanding commanders, famous marshals, who, in terms of party and military service, and work experience, are often head and shoulders above him.
3. Many of the most important issues of further strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state, improving the organizational structure of the troops, their technical equipment, and improving the quality of combat and operational training were not discussed, and their resolution was artificially delayed. At the same time, a number of important issues are being resolved behind the scenes, without thorough study and discussion.
One of these decisions was the reorganization of the Armed Forces carried out at the beginning of this year, including the secondary disbandment of the command and General Staff of the Ground Forces, as well as the reorganization of the command of groups of forces and military districts. This fundamental decision was not discussed either at the Board of the Ministry of Defense or at the Main Military Council. It was the fruit of individual decisions and was unexpected for the Armed Forces. I report with full responsibility that the majority of marshals and generals, commanders and commanders of various levels do not approve of this decision and consider it harmful to the cause.
4. In the fall of 1962, our country was brought to the extreme brink of thermonuclear war. Who decided to send missiles to Cuba? - Khrushchev. And who supported him in this worthless and adventurous business? - Malinovsky and Grechko. They sent the now deceased Comrade Biryuzov to Cuba to scout out the conditions for the installation of missiles and persuade Castro, and then falsely informed the government about favorable conditions for the secret placement of missiles on the island at a time when they could be observed by anyone who was not too lazy. What came of it? American intelligence quickly learned about the delivery of our missiles, immediately checked, and as a result we had to retreat in disgrace. However, Khrushchev later argued that preventing the Americans from landing in Cuba was worth sending these missiles. This is an excuse for youngsters, not for serious people. As a result, we not only retreated, but also seriously undermined our prestige as a powerful country leading the socialist camp.
5. The current and ever-increasing military tension with the Chinese on our Far Eastern borders is the fruit of Khrushchev’s cult of personality, as well as incorrect information from the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. To please Khrushchev's wishes, the minister sends troops to the Far Eastern borders, which further increases tensions and mistrust between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union. Last year, 1963, I was in the Far East and studied the situation there. Upon my return, I reported to the minister the actual state of affairs, but Malinovsky didn't bother to consider my reports. I asked Khrushchev to accept me on this issue, but it was not accepted.
I personally was in China under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek and I myself saw and felt that the Chinese people loved and respected the Russians most strongly. The Soviet word ‘Sulyang’ was the most honorable and sacred on the lips of ordinary Chinese. The question is, why aggravate the situation on the border with China? After all, if we send to Far East one division, then the Chinese will send 5, we will send 5 divisions, the Chinese will send 25, etc. Why is this? The military tension created on the border with China only benefits our enemies, the imperialists. It is no coincidence that they are already beginning to applaud this state of affairs. Taking advantage of our differences, the Americans bombed the socialist country of Vietnam for the first time in history, not to mention their provocative actions in Laos, Cambodia and other areas.
6. The Minister of Defense and the General Staff achieved the separation of the Armed Forces from the Civil Defense, which, in my opinion, will lead to the most difficult situation for the country in wartime. The complex of all defense measures must be unified and managed from a single center. In no case should the active defense of the country (actions of the Armed Forces) be separated from the so-called passive defense (Civil Defense). In a future thermonuclear war, the country that will win is the one that will be able to survive, i.e., will be capable of not only delivering powerful strikes and actively conducting broad offensive operations at the front but will also be able to preserve the multi-million population and economic potential from enemy nuclear strikes. It is especially important to preserve the working class and intelligentsia, which are currently concentrated time in industrial centers, which are already targeted by missiles and planes in peacetime enemies.
Even the great Lenin at one time emphasized: '... if we save the working man, we save the main productive force of mankind, the worker, we will return everything, but we will perish if we fail to save him...' / Works, vol. 29, pp. 334-335/. The main task of the country’s survival cannot be successfully solved without the closest interaction between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense and the advance organization of this interaction in peacetime. And in past wars it was impossible to achieve victory without a strong rear. And in a modern war, when the entire territory of the country will be under attack, the role of protecting the rear increases immeasurably. By the way, although we don’t necessarily need to do everything the way our potential adversaries do, we still cannot help but note that they are building and organizing the civil defense of their countries in close cooperation with the armed forces and under unified leadership.
7. I cannot help but touch upon the inculcation of the spirit of sycophancy and servility in the Armed Forces. The first sycophant under Zhukov was Malinovsky himself. Under Khrushchev, his sycophancy increased even more. The lessons of the 20th Party Congress did not serve him well. It has come to the point that he fawns not only before his superiors, but even before his subordinates, knowing Khrushchev’s special disposition towards them. This is especially clearly seen in his relationship with Grechko. Malinovsky, with the active support of Grechko, surrounded himself with sycophants and pleasers.
To please Khrushchev and his own vanity, the history of the Great Patriotic War began to be distorted. The military operations in which they participated, especially together with Khrushchev, began to be extolled in every possible way, and other, more important and outstanding operations were belittled. It has come to the point of assertions that we owe almost all our victories to Khrushchev, Malinovsky, Grechko and others like them. If the matter were limited only to history, it would not be so bad. But the spirit of servility will lead to more serious mistakes, since in military affairs it is especially dangerous because it will have to be paid for with the blood and lives of many millions of people. Sneak in to please his superiors, he distorts the truth, praises stupidity, implements stupid and incorrect decisions, and the business suffers as a result.
8. The Party constantly teaches us to select leading personnel in business and political signs. But this principle is currently being systematically violated by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Very often, promotion to responsible positions is carried out as a matter of friendly relations, on the basis of previous joint service and servility. This is especially clearly seen in the example of the appointment of General Penkovsky as Deputy Minister of Defense for Combat Training. This nomination by Malinovsky of his protégé deeply offended the overwhelming majority of our generals and officers. After all, everyone knows that Penkovsky does not like, does not know and does not know how to organize combat training. He failed it while commanding the Far Eastern and Belarusian military districts. In these districts, which have long been famous for the quality of combat training of troops, under Penkovsky’s command, combat training was in a rut, and inspections revealed very serious shortcomings. And now they trusted him to lead combat training on the scale of the entire Armed Forces, as if among the commanders of districts and groups of forces there was no commander more knowledgeable and loving in this matter.
Such appointments cannot be called anything other than arbitrariness on the part of Malinovsky. And many more similar examples can be given.
All of the above forces me to frankly report to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee that I, as a member of the Central Committee and a military leader, do not trust the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense. There is no self-criticism, and criticism is not tolerated. Currently, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is occupied by people who sacrifice state interests for their position and their own well-being. Such leadership cannot ensure the preparation of our Armed Forces to fulfill the tasks assigned to them by the Party and the people.
There is also no guarantee that the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense, 'saving the honor of their uniform,' will report the true situation to the Central Committee. And this is especially dangerous at the present time.”
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
V. CHUIKOV
Taken from: “Letter from V.I. Chuikov to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the abnormal situation in the USSR Ministry of Defense,” October 21, 1964, ed. Sergey Kudryashov, Bulletin of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation: Soviet Army: Years of reform and testing, Vol. T. 2 (M.: EastLit, 2018). pp. 203–207.
Comentarios